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NO. 29 JUNE 2019 Introduction 
5G and the US–China Tech Rivalry – a Test 
for Europe’s Future in the Digital Age 
How Can Europe Shift from Back Foot to Front Foot? 
Tim Rühlig (UI), John Seaman (Ifri) and Daniel Voelsen (SWP) 
Until late last year, most Europeans only knew Huawei as one of many smartphone 
manufacturers gaining ground in stores across the continent. But in recent months, 
the tech giant has turned into a symbol of a high-stakes wrestling match between the 
world’s premier superpower, the United States, and its increasingly ambitious and 
capable challenger, China. Indeed, the impending rollout of 5G infrastructure has 
become a key battleground in a broader struggle for control over the industries of 
the future. Europe has meanwhile been caught on its back foot and urgently needs 
to develop a strategy to not only guide it through the current 5G debate, but also the 
tech rivalries that are still to come. 
 
With dramatically higher data transfer 
speeds and decreased latency, 5G carries the 
promise of revolutionizing all spheres of 
daily life: from self-driving vehicles to health-
care to the “internet of things” and the digi-
talization of industrial production processes 
and so-called smart cities. Huawei currently 
leads the field in 5G infrastructure and as 
such, for the first time in modern history, 
China is in a prime position to lead the world 
in the rollout of a potentially game-chang-
ing technology. This prospect has caused 
fierce pushback from Washington and jit-
ters across Europe and much of the West. 
For months, the United States has been 
pressuring its European allies to enact an 
outright ban of Huawei from the rollout 
of 5G infrastructure on the continent. US 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even warned 
that allies who deal with the company will 
no longer be privy to American intelligence. 
China, in turn, threatened retaliation against 
European countries inclined to give in to 
US demands. China’s ambassador to the 
European Union (EU), Zhang Ming, spoke of 
“serious consequences” for economic and 
scientific cooperation, whereas China’s am-
bassador to Poland warned of “steep costs” 
for Poland if it decided to ban Huawei. 
Caught between the two powers, Europe’s 
vulnerability is clearly visible: On the one 
hand, European countries depend on Chi-
na’s central position in the value chain for 
information and communication technology 
(ICT), in particular regarding hardware; on 
the other hand, the United States domi-
nates software development and remains 
Europe’s prime security guarantor. 
SWP Comment 29 
June 2019 
2 
Complicating matters further, the Trump 
administration announced on May 15 that 
Huawei would figure on the “Entity List” of 
the US Department of Commerce, effectively 
placing sanctions on the Chinese tech giant 
and banning all access to US technology 
(from microchips to critical software). This 
decision constitutes a major blow to the 
company that has the potential to severely 
affect its operations. It is also a clear signal 
to Western allies that the United States is 
serious in its campaign to stop Huawei’s 
growing influence. For its part, China has 
responded with its own broadly defined 
“unreliable entities list” of countries, com-
panies, or persons that “seriously damage 
the legitimate interests” of Chinese com-
panies. 
In this situation, Europeans risk becom-
ing mere objects in a geopolitical struggle 
for technological leadership that will 
significantly shape our future. The defense 
of European interests and values in this 
context will require Europeans to develop 
a common political strategy – based on 
sound principles and objective criteria – 
for navigating the geopolitical conflicts that 
new technology will bring. The 5G debate 
adds a sense of urgency to this quest. 
5G – the First “Battleground” of 
an Emerging Geopolitical Tech 
Competition 
Although mobile telecommunication has 
always been the subject of economic com-
petition from companies around the globe, 
the United States and China have a some-
what different perspective of the new, fifth 
generation of mobile internet. Leaders in 
both countries view the competition over 
5G not just in commercial terms, but also 
as a matter of geopolitical rivalry. 
The US government frames 5G as a mat-
ter of national security. This argument rests 
on three pillars: security, economy, and sys-
temic confrontation. 
In terms of security, the fear is that 
Huawei infrastructure equipment could 
facilitate political and/or industrial espio-
nage. Indeed, the case leveled against the 
Chinese tech giant by the US Department 
of Justice makes it clear that American offi-
cials believe that Huawei’s success is due in 
part to a corporate policy of espionage and 
IP theft. Even more importantly, intelli-
gence agencies warn that the Chinese state 
could draw on Huawei to intentionally 
disrupt Western communication networks, 
particularly in the event of a major con-
flagration. With the connected economies 
of the future being highly dependent on 
these networks, this would likely be a tool 
of last resort, but one with a highly dis-
ruptive impact on the targeted society. 
Economically, a core American concern 
is the desire to protect US industries from 
“unfair competition” and to avoid over-
dependence on the Chinese economy and 
Chinese technology, in particular. Central 
to this line of argument is the notion that 
succeeding in China to the degree that 
Huawei has no doubt requires a great deal 
of political connection and leverage. 
Huawei is a company of strategic impor-
tance to China that receives preferential 
treatment, including financial, political, 
and diplomatic support. As with all other 
Chinese companies, the Communist Party 
is formally represented within the company 
with more than 300 party cells, though its 
actual influence is hard to gauge from the 
outside. This preferential treatment has the 
potential to threaten other vendors in a 
market that is already highly concentrated. 
Most crucially, the radio access network 
technology, which is essential for the 
rollout of 5G, is currently supplied by only 
three vendors at the global level, namely 
Huawei, Ericsson, and Nokia. 
Finally, the United States perceives the 
rivalry over 5G infrastructure as part of a 
systemic confrontation. In this view, the 
liberal democratic world must defend itself 
against the increasing influence of authori-
tarian China. China’s National Intelligence 
Law of 2017 (amended in 2018) requiring 
the country’s information technology (IT) 
firms to “support, assist in and cooperate in 
national intelligence work” and the state’s 
continuous disrespect for fundamental 
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principles of the rule of law are often cited 
in this context. On this account, Huawei 
is seen as part of China’s authoritarian am-
bitions: Although a “smoking gun” has 
yet to emerge, the company has long been 
suspected of having close links to the Chi-
nese intelligence community and the 
Chinese military. Furthermore, Huawei is 
deeply involved in establishing comprehen-
sive domestic surveillance in China, cooper-
ating with the Ministry of State Security by 
means of new, innovative technology. 
However, it is not only the United States 
that perceives 5G through a geopolitical 
lens. China, for its part, aims to achieve an 
increasing amount of control over a broad 
range of economic flows through the devel-
opment of infrastructure on the Eurasian 
landmass and beyond. Most important in 
this context is the country’s Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), which is an infrastructure 
development and investment tool that has 
turned into China’s predominant foreign 
policy platform. China tries to spread its 
influence to BRI countries by means of 
financing, designing, constructing, and 
sometimes even owning and operating 
digital and physical infrastructure. This 
helps it to gain control over flows of goods, 
services, and – most importantly in the 
context of the discussion at hand – data. 
Even though China does not publicly 
declare the geopolitical underpinnings of 
this initiative, Chinese strategists are aware 
of – and explicit about – them when 
speaking off the record. 
In light of these geopolitical considera-
tions on the part of the United States and 
China, we can expect 5G to be only the first 
chapter in an increasingly heated techno-
logical competition between the two politi-
cal rivals, both of whom are aiming to 
establish, defend, or expand their geograph-
ical and sectoral spheres of influence by 
controlling data flows through innovative 
high technology. 
This geopolitical take on technology is 
by no means without an alternative. In fact, 
interconnectedness has long been perceived 
as a global public good serving as the engine 
of globalization. Accordingly, does Europe 
necessarily need to adopt this geopolitical 
approach to digital infrastructure in order 
to succeed? Regardless of the response to 
this question, the EU has to respond to the 
geopolitical narrative and the explicit pres-
sures placed on it by the United States and 
China. 
Europe’s Varied Responses 
In late 2018, the geopolitical confrontation 
between the United States and China over 
Huawei’s role in the deployment of 5G net-
works reached Europe. The media picked 
up on the reports about potential dangers 
emanating from Huawei’s products and the 
growing confrontation between the United 
States and China, leading to questions 
about European governments’ approaches 
to the issue. 
Initially, it seemed that there would be 
a sharp split in Europe over this question. 
The Polish government openly called for 
the exclusion of Huawei after arresting and 
charging one of the company’s employees 
with espionage in January 2019. The British 
government also seemed to be heading in 
that direction. At the time, countries such 
as Germany, France, and Italy, on the con-
trary, saw no reason at all to revise their 
policies, or at least remained largely silent 
on the issue. In the case of Portugal, the 
country’s main telecoms operator even 
signed a contract with Huawei on 5G co-
operation, just as the question was going 
viral. By now, however, many EU member 
states tend toward some middle ground: 
They do not want to single out Huawei but 
aim to formulate more general require-
ments for the security of mobile networks. 
The European Commission, moreover, has 
initiated an effort to coordinate member 
states’ policies on the issue, and national 
governments have been asked to undertake 
an assessment of the risks related to 5G by 
the end of June. 
To understand the current state of the 
debate in Europe, it is helpful to analytically 
distinguish two ways of approaching the 
issue: The first is openly political and focuses 
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on the larger geopolitical context; the second 
approach is primarily technical and focuses 
on matters of network security. The two ap-
proaches are not mutually exclusive, but in 
many cases, it is possible to identify what 
approach primarily guides a state’s actions. 
Approach 1: 
National Security and Geopolitics 
The first approach situates the issue of 5G 
within the broader context of geopolitics. 
It starts from the observation that with 5G, 
modern societies become vulnerable in new 
ways. Crucially, however, it conceives of 
these new vulnerabilities not just as more 
instances of IT (in)security but as serious 
threats to the national security of states. In 
essence, this approach adopts the US per-
spective – perceiving 5G as one element 
of a multidimensional and long-term con-
frontation between China and the West. 
This conflict has a security dimension but 
also plays out in the economic sphere. 
Quite fundamentally, it is increasingly 
being interpreted as a confrontation 
between two different political and eco-
nomic systems (not unlike the earlier Cold 
War confrontation between the United 
States and the Soviet Union). 
This perspective also informs the risk 
assessment regarding the specifics of 5G: 
Even though there has not yet been any 
proof that the Chinese government has 
used Huawei technology to harm Western 
societies, the mere possibility that this might 
happen at some point in the future is con-
sidered reason enough to take drastic meas-
ures. Also, this perspective leads to sharp 
distinctions between vendors based on their 
political backgrounds: A company under 
the control of the Chinese government 
(directly or indirectly) is seen as a greater 
threat than a company from the United 
States, Europe, or South Korea. The goal, 
then, is to avoid a situation in which an 
authoritarian state such as China has any 
relevant control over critical Western infra-
structure. 
As described in the previous section, this 
approach is being pushed vehemently by 
the current US administration. The Austral-
ian government also has committed itself 
to this approach and was, in fact, the first 
to explicitly raise the alarm on 5G. Within 
Europe, states such as Poland and the Czech 
Republic also seem susceptible – at least 
to some degree – to such a perspective. In 
particular, the intelligence services of many 
states seem to share the US–Australian 
assessment of the threat posed by Huawei. 
Since it seems almost impossible for 
liberal states to single out one company or 
country, we now observe attempts to turn 
this approach into non-arbitrary general 
principles. The main hook here is a strong 
emphasis on the political backgrounds of 
vendors. For instance, in March the German 
government published a (not legally bind-
ing) list of key security requirements for 
future networks, which starts out with the 
requirement that “[s]ystems may only be 
sourced from trustworthy suppliers whose 
compliance with national security regula-
tions and provisions for the secrecy of tele-
communications and for data protection is 
assured.” 
In some cases, this more openly political 
evaluation of vendors is furthermore com-
bined with broad discretion for the execu-
tive. The model for this is the Australian 
law that authorizes the government to ban 
vendors “likely to be subject to extrajudicial 
directions from a foreign government.” A 
new law under consideration in France, 
currently being reviewed by the Senate, 
likewise assigns the prime minister’s office 
the responsibility to assess whether a par-
ticular vendor poses a threat to national 
security, without explicitly assigning re-
sponsibility to a specific agency. Although 
the French government would likely rely 
on the technical expertise of relevant state 
agencies (e.g., the National Cybersecurity 
Agency of France, ANSSI), the leeway granted 
to the political authorities contrasts starkly 
with the way the British and German gov-
ernments have so far approached the issue, 
explicitly delegating the evaluation of these 
products to specialized technical agencies. 
Only recently did Italy adopt an approach 
similar to the one being debated in France. 
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Interestingly, the recently published 
“Prague Proposals” also seem mostly in-
spired by the geopolitical approach. These 
proposals were published by the Czech 
government after a two-day conference of 
32 states from the “Western” world at the 
beginning of May. Although they do not 
represent any official consensus of the 
participating states, they shed light on the 
state of the debate. The proposals empha-
size national self-determination and national 
security; they also include demanding 
political conditions that, without mention-
ing Huawei, seem quite clearly directed 
toward China: “The overall risk of influence 
on a supplier by a third country should be 
taken into account, notably in relation to 
its model of governance, the absence of 
cooperation agreements on security”. It 
does not come as a great surprise that the 
US administration publicly endorsed the 
Prague Proposals, whereas the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized them 
as politicizing a technical question. 
Approach 2: Network Security 
In comparison to a more political “national 
security” approach, the network security 
approach focuses on the security challenges 
of digital communication networks them-
selves. It thus identifies the two potential 
dangers of espionage and sabotage as the 
main challenges and aims to finding tech-
nical solutions to limit or mitigate these 
risks. 
Even before the current 5G discussion, 
the United Kingdom pursued this approach 
by subjecting Huawei products to intensive 
auditing by technical specialists. The idea 
to exclude Huawei from the core networks 
but allow network operators to use the 
company’s products for the radio access 
network is also guided by this approach 
(though, unlike with earlier mobile stand-
ards, many experts question the possibility 
of maintaining this distinction with 5G). 
The already mentioned public statement 
by the German government also includes 
the requirement for more extensive audit-
ing and certification of network technology. 
In a quite detailed manner, it also lists addi-
tional security measures such as data traffic 
control and transparent software deploy-
ment. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for 
redundancy in mobile networks and formu-
lates the aim to avoid “monocultures” by 
“using network and system components 
from different manufacturers.” Such diver-
sity of network infrastructures, while costly, 
would limit the impact of an attack on any 
specific product. 
Promoting end-to-end encryption on the 
application level would very likely be an 
effective means to protect against espionage 
through access on the infrastructure level. 
Yet, strong encryption is not high on the 
agenda for either the United Kingdom or 
Germany. Most likely, this is because the 
issue of encryption is controversial within 
these and other states: Law enforcement 
agencies are wary that better encryption 
will make their work more difficult. The 
problem, however, is that states thus de-
prive themselves of one of the most effec-
tive means to prevent espionage. 
Hard Choices Ahead 
The analytical distinction between the two 
approaches is not meant to suggest that 
states strictly follow one or the other. In-
deed, as the example of Germany shows, 
many states try to combine both. Still, the 
two approaches inform policy-making in 
different ways: The geopolitical approach 
leads to an emphasis on openly political 
measures; the “network security” approach, 
on the contrary, focuses more on technical 
solutions. 
When a state approaches the issue of 5G 
within a geopolitical framework, it would 
be highly questionable – if not irrespon-
sible – not to also include many of the 
technical solutions proposed to increase 
network security. After all, if network secu-
rity is seen as important enough to enter 
into serious inter-state confrontations, 
states should also do everything in their 
power to increase security through tech-
nical measures. 
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In this context, it is quite remarkable 
that – at least in the short term – the 
recent decisions by the US administration 
may actually create new security risks. 
A number of rural telecommunication 
operators in the United States that rely on 
Huawei products will not be able to receive 
any software updates after the 90-day 
“grace period,” including security patches. 
Moreover, whereas Huawei never gained 
ground in the US consumer market, it is 
not clear what will happen to millions of 
Huawei mobile phone customers in Europe. 
They will likely not be able to update their 
phones with the newest versions of Alpha-
bet’s Android mobile operating system. 
Indeed, most likely they will have to choose 
between using an outdated operating sys-
tem or installing an Android variant (or 
“fork”) that builds on Android’s open 
source components but is combined with 
specifications and additions provided by 
Huawei. 
On the other hand, it is possible to focus 
on network security without framing the 
issue as one of geopolitics. States can invest 
to create redundant and diverse network 
structures and increase the auditing and 
certification of the technology used by net-
work operators – all without explicitly 
taking sides in the geopolitical struggle 
between the United States and China. Right 
now, it seems that the United Kingdom 
is trying to stick to this strategy. But this 
approach is also political on a higher level: 
It avoids geopolitics at the risk of creating 
vulnerabilities in interactions with states 
that very strategically pursue their own 
geopolitical interests. 
Most crucial in this context is that China 
is massively financing, designing, and con-
structing as well as gaining ownership and 
operating critical infrastructure on the 
Eurasian landmass and beyond, namely 
through the BRI. In particular, the BRI 
explicitly comprises a digital component, 
the “Digital Silk Road.” The rationale 
behind this initiative is not just to promote 
Chinese high technology, but also to gain 
control over the flows of goods, services, 
and – most importantly – data. If one 
takes this Chinese ambition seriously, a 
short-term focus on network security might 
be seen as failing to address this more long-
term strategic conflict. 
In addition, not choosing a side in a con-
text of increasing polarization could in it-
self be perceived as choosing China’s side. 
The attempt to avoid geopolitics thus bears 
the risk of creating a serious rift with one of 
Europe’s closest allies. 
It is not surprising, then, that many 
states in Europe appear to be attracted to a 
form of “geopolitics light,” combining an 
emphasis on network security with some 
more openly political measures (e.g., France, 
Germany). Indeed, this strategy is currently 
the most promising for Europe because it 
facilitates a degree of political and diplo-
matic maneuverability, allowing states the 
flexibility to address the perceived geo-
political risks without fully getting drawn 
into the confrontation between the United 
States and China. 
The challenge with this strategy, how-
ever, is that “geopolitics light” is still geo-
politics. When states in Europe decide to 
deny, or seriously restrict, market access for 
companies from specific countries – be it 
China or other states – these states will 
perceive such restrictions as geopolitically 
motivated. Thus, when considering “politi-
cal” criteria in the context of the debate on 
the security of 5G networks, states must be 
clear about what level of geopolitical con-
frontation they deem necessary to defend 
their security interests – and what level of 
confrontation they are willing and able to 
endure. The trick is identifying what dose 
of politically and strategically motivated 
considerations would be sufficient without 
unnecessarily widening geopolitical rifts 
that paint all future tech competition in a 
clearly confrontational light. 
The distinctly geopolitical goal here 
would be to not only increase network secu-
rity but to also defend the principles that 
are constitutive of Europe’s political order. 
These include an emphasis on the rule of 
law, democratic accountability, as well as a 
commitment to fair competition. The ques-
tion, then, is what measures would be 
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necessary to defend these principles? 
Requirements for more transparency of 
vendors – both in terms of their financial 
workings as well as concerning their cor-
porate governance structures – for in-
stance, could be a necessary means to 
protect the European model of rule of law. 
The challenge, however, is to use such 
requirements in ways that do not them-
selves undermine basic principles of the 
rule of law; that is, it must be ensured that 
such requirements are applied in a non-
arbitrary way that provides those affected 
with effective means of contestation. 
Pressing Questions 
All over Europe, the deployment of 5G 
networks will soon begin. In the coming 
months, Europeans will have to settle on 
what their approach to the issue will be. 
The recent decisions by the US administra-
tion have made this even more difficult. If 
the United States upholds its export restric-
tions, this may seriously impact Huawei’s 
ability to offer its products and services. In 
fact, to the extent that Huawei depends on 
US companies to provide hardware com-
ponents for their network technology (e.g., 
semiconductors), the company may simply 
not be able to offer its products and services 
to European telecommunication compa-
nies. The US export restrictions would thus 
effectively render the European debate on 
Huawei as merely being theoretical. 
In this particular situation, thus, Europe 
has become a bystander, at least for the 
moment. If Europe wants to defend its own 
interests – not only in this particular case, 
but also with regard to the larger tech rivalry 
between the United States and China – its 
member states will have to be very clear 
about their interests as well as the adequate 
means to pursue them. To this end, we 
want to emphasize four questions that 
seem most pressing to us. 
(1) What is the cost of security? From a 
technical perspective, promoting the diver-
sity and redundancy of network infrastruc-
ture is the best way to protect against 
network disruptions. Yet, this extra level 
of security is costly, like any backup system. 
So if states are serious about the need to 
protect digital infrastructure, they will also 
have to engage in an open debate about 
these costs. Moreover, they will have to 
develop new governance mechanisms for 
ensuring that the private companies which 
operate the networks fulfill these criteria. 
After all, this requires a detailed level of 
centralized planning to coordinate the 
activities of all the network operators in-
volved. 
(2) How can “political trustworthiness” 
be objectively assessed? The idea of political 
“trustworthiness” is inevitably vague. If 
states want to take into account the politi-
cal backgrounds of companies involved 
in providing critical public infrastructure, 
they will need to define more specifically 
what kind of political commitment they 
expect from these companies. What is un-
controversial is that companies operating in 
a state must abide by that state’s laws. The 
more specific fear, however, seems to be 
that some companies are unduly influenced 
by their home state’s governments. In some 
cases, that may well be the case. The ques-
tions, however, are what counts as suffi-
cient proof of such undue influence, and, 
on the other hand, what serves to render 
a company as “trustworthy”? If European 
states cannot offer clear and objective cri-
teria for the requirement of “trustworthi-
ness,” any decision on these grounds will 
be perceived as arbitrary – and thereby 
threaten the European legal order. 
Even more fundamentally, the issue of 
trustworthiness seems to go beyond indi-
vidual companies. Despite all the focus on 
Huawei, the real issue seems to be whether 
the Chinese state can be sufficiently trusted 
not to use Chinese companies to harm 
European states. In addition to measures 
aimed at companies, another option could 
thus be to explicitly address these issues in 
diplomatic relations with China. 
(3) Can Europe find consensus and forge 
its own path? In their dealings with the 
issue, the states in Europe should also con-
sider the impact of their actions on the 
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European Union as a whole. A joint and 
coordinated EU approach promises not only 
a higher level of security but also seems 
necessary to formulate an independent 
position in the geopolitical confrontation 
between the United States and China: Only 
a united Europe will be able to forge its 
own path in terms of digital technology and 
protect itself against possible Chinese or 
American retaliation. In a first positive sign, 
the heads of states and governments of all 
EU member states launched a process of 
coordination on March 22 at the meeting 
of the European Council. Here, Europe can 
and should build on its success in drafting 
new data protection regulations and in 
establishing an EU-wide screening mecha-
nism on foreign investment. 
The ongoing process of coordination 
launched in March by the European Coun-
cil finds its legal basis in two cybersecurity 
documents (i.e., the Directive on Security of 
Network and Information Systems of 2016 
and the new EU Cybersecurity Act, which 
was adopted by the European Parliament 
in March 2019) as well as in the EU’s tele-
communication rules, which entered into 
force as early as 2009. 
Other fields to consider a common ap-
proach include competition law and public 
procurement rules, which could help pre-
vent over-dependencies from individual 
companies and – potentially, if European 
law is revised accordingly – from groups 
of companies from one country. 
Finally, the China strategy of the EU 
and in some of its member states (e.g., the 
Netherlands) is undergoing a fundamental 
shift. The EU seems to agree more and more 
that China should be considered a partner, 
a competitor, and a strategic rival at the 
same time, depending on the specific con-
text and the policy field. Technological 
competition and Europe’s dependence on 
global ICT supply chains should be included 
more systematically in this context and 
become an integral part of the EU’s Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy. Hence, we 
consider it a positive and logical step that 
the issue is currently being discussed not 
only in institutions dealing with network 
security (such as DG Connect and the Euro-
pean Union Agency for Network and Infor-
mation Security, ENISA) but also within the 
European External Action Service, which is 
coordinating a member states-driven pro-
cess as part of the Union’s foreign policy. 
(4) What lessons can we draw from other 
partners on hedging geopolitical risks? 
While Europe is still grappling with finding 
its own approach, it should also closely 
monitor what is happening in other regions 
of the world. For both China and the United 
States, Europe is only one part of their geo-
political contest. Indeed, some variation of 
the European 5G debate can be observed in 
many states, from technologically advanced 
economies such as Japan and South Korea 
to developing countries throughout Africa 
and Southeast Asia. Europe might do well 
to engage with these countries in an ex-
change on how to deal with the threat of 
becoming a mere object in geopolitical 
power games. 
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